On 1 August 2025, in case C-600/23 Royal Football Club Seraing SA v. Fédération Internationale De Football Associations (FIFA), Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA), Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL (URBSFA), the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) issued a significant ruling against FIFA, this time focusing on the exclusivity of FIFA’s dispute settlement mechanism. In the ruling, the Court essentially held that Member States would be precluded from recognising the force of “res judicata” to such arbitral awards where the conformity of those awards with European Union (EU) law has not first been subject to review by a court of a Member State having jurisdiction to do so and, where appropriate, the power to refer questions of interpretation to the Court.
Background to the dispute
In 2015, Royal Football Club Seraing SA, a club associated to URBSFA (the “Club”), concluded an initial contract with Doyen Sports, a Maltese entity, establishing a framework for a prospective provision of financial assistance to the club in exchange for the acquisition of a portion of the economic rights of certain players. However, under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (the “FIFA Regulations”), contracts entailing the transfer of economic rights over players to third parties, commonly referred to as third-party ownership (TPO) agreements, are prohibited, under a public policy rationale aimed at preserving club independence and avoiding undue third-party influence.
Since these rules are binding on all members of FIFA and its affiliated national associations, including URBSFA, disciplinary proceedings were opened against the Club on 2 July 2015. Finding a breach of the mandatory prohibition on TPO agreements, both FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee and its Appeal Committee upheld the sanctions imposed. The Club then appealed before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the appellate body within FIFA’s dispute-settlement system, arguing, inter alia, that the FIFA Regulations infringed fundamental principles of EU law, including competition law and the freedom of movement of workers and services. While CAS examined these arguments, it ultimately dismissed the appeal, considering the connection with EU law to be limited. These findings were subsequently confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which dismissed the Club’s appeal on 20 February 2018.
In parallel, judicial proceedings were initiated in Belgium by Doyen Sports, relying on the alleged incompatibility of the FIFA Regulations with EU law. In 2016, following a decision by the Brussels Commercial Court declining jurisdiction, the Club appealed to the Brussels Court of Appeal. In its judgment of 12 December 2019, rendered approximately two years after the CAS’ award and the decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court of Appeal held that the Club’s arguments had already been decided within FIFA’s arbitral system. Relying on Belgian procedural law, the court found that the CAS award had acquired the authority of res judicata from the date of the Swiss judgment, rendering the Club’s claims inadmissible.
The Club subsequently lodged an appeal before the Belgian Court of Cassation, which then referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The issues at stake
The case is remarkable from several standpoints. The proceedings before FIFA’s dispute-settlement bodies, concerning the alleged infringement of the FIFA Regulations, were disciplinary in nature. Within that framework, the Club raised the incompatibility of those regulations with several quasi-constitutional provisions of EU law, in particular the rules on competition and on the free movement of persons. From this perspective, notwithstanding their declared rationale of public order, protecting the independence of clubs and preventing undue external influence, the prohibitions contained in the FIFA Regulations arguably restricted competition and contractual freedom. By barring third-party investors such as Doyen Sports from entering into financing arrangements with clubs, the FIFA system effectively excluded independent operators from participating in the economic aspects of professional football, thereby limiting both market access and free movement within the Union.
The dispute thus revived, in a new guise, the question of the compatibility between FIFA’s internal rules and the EU legal order, already examined in Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) v. BZ (see our previous article) and in European Superleague Company (see our previous article). As in those earlier cases, the core tension lay between FIFA’s claimed autonomy in regulating sport and the overarching requirements of EU law. In its award, CAS adopted a cautious approach: it acknowledged the relevance of EU law but concluded that the impact of the FIFA Regulations on competition and free movement was not sufficiently significant to justify their disapplication. While deferential to FIFA’s regulatory authority, this reasoning effectively shielded the organisation’s economic structure from external scrutiny, a position later confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
However, once the matter reached the Belgian courts, a different issue of principle arose. The Brussels Court of Appeal, relying on Belgian procedural law, held that the CAS award had acquired the authority of “res judicata”, thus preventing any further judicial examination of the compatibility of the FIFA Regulations with EU law. This “blockage” of access to judicial review raised a distinct and fundamental question before the Court of Justice: whether Member States are obliged, under Article 19, para. 1, of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), to ensure that individuals have access to remedies allowing the effective judicial protection of rights derived from EU law, even in areas, such as sports arbitration, that operate within a transnational regulatory system.
The findings of the Court
The Court essentially held that the aforementioned Article 19, para. 1, TEU, read together with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 47 CFR, precludes a national (Belgian, in this case) legislation granting “res judicata” to arbitral awards rendered by bodies such as the CAS, where the dispute involves the exercise of an economic activity within the EU and no effective judicial review by the courts of a Member State capable of referring a question to the Court has taken place.
The Court recognised that, under Belgian procedural law, arbitral awards, once recognised or enforced, may acquire the authority of “res judicata”, implying that national courts are bound by their determinations and cannot re-examine the merits of the dispute. In the present case, this rule led Belgian courts to refuse to reconsider the legality of the CAS’ decision confirming the sanctions imposed on the Club, on the basis that the award already enjoyed final and binding effect. As a result, the club was deprived of the possibility to have the compatibility of that decision with EU law reviewed by a Belgian court capable of submitting a preliminary reference to the Court.
Against this backdrop, the Court emphasised that, while international arbitration remains a legitimate means of dispute resolution, it cannot deprive individuals or undertakings of their right to effective judicial protection under EU law. This right requires that a court of a Member State retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with Union law and, where appropriate, to make a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU. From this standpoint, the Court observed that the arbitration mechanism established under the statutes of FIFA and its dispute settlement system, seated in Switzerland (and based on the competence of the Swiss Supreme Court as judge of last-instance), effectively excluded any review by an EU-based court competent to verify the conformity of CAS’ arbitral award with EU competition or internal market rules, such as the freedom of movement of workers and services.
By conferring automatic and definitive legal effects to arbitral awards, national rules, such as those applied by the Belgian courts in this case, risked affecting the rights derived from EU law, rendering them illusory. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Member States must ensure that arbitral awards involving disputes connected to EU law be subject to effective judicial control within the EU’s legal order. To do so, national courts would be required, if necessary, to set aside domestic rules that would prevent such review or would preclude the exercise of the right to an effective remedy.
The way forward
Following the judgment in Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) v. BZ, this ruling represents the fourth significant setback for FIFA in less than two (2) years. Consistent with the approach developed in its seminal Kadi case-law, the Court once again demonstrated its readiness to scrutinise rules established within autonomous regulatory systems, even those originating outside the Union’s legal order, to ensure their conformity with the EU’s constitutional framework.
In this instance, the Court made clear that the private arbitration structures organised under the FIFA framework cannot operate in isolation from EU law guarantees, particularly where they affect the economic activity of clubs and players established within the internal market. By insisting on the primacy of effective judicial protection and access to a court capable of referring questions through the preliminary ruling mechanisms, the Court reaffirmed that no autonomous sporting or arbitral order may escape the reach of EU law when it interferes with rights derived from the Treaties.
The decision therefore reinforces a clear trajectory: FIFA’s regulatory autonomy “ends” where the EU’s rule of law begins. What was once seen as a self-contained international sports jurisdiction is increasingly subject to the discipline of the EU legal order, whether in matters of competition law, free movement or – in this case – effective judicial protection. For FIFA and related bodies, this judgment further underscores the need to adapt their governance and dispute resolution systems to the standards of the rule of law, implying judicial oversight, required under EU law.
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