On 2 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union dismissed the appeal brought by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. against the judgment of the General Court in the Google Android case, confirming the fine of EUR 4.125 billion imposed on Google for abuse of dominant position in relation to the Android mobile ecosystem. The judgment is significant not only because of the size of the fine, but also because it confirms the Commission's ability to challenge contractual and technical restrictions used by dominant digital platforms to protect and reinforce their position across connected markets.
The case sits at the intersection of traditional competition law and the more recent EU regulatory framework applicable to digital platforms, including the Digital Markets Act, which is aimed precisely at preventing gatekeepers from using entrenched ecosystem advantages to foreclose competition.
Background to the dispute
The case originates from the Commission's decision of 18 July 2018 in Case AT.40099- Google Android. The Commission found that Google had imposed anticompetitive contractual restrictions on original equipment manufacturers and mobile network operators in order to protect and strengthen its dominant position on national markets for general search services within the EEA.
In its analysis, the Commission stated that Google acquired the company that had developed Android in 2005, at a time when mobile internet use was expected to become increasingly important for online search. By July 2018, most smart mobile devices used in Europe and worldwide ran on Android. Although Android's source code was made available under an open-source licence, Google's proprietary apps and services, including Play Store, Google Search and Chrome, were not part of that open-source layer and were made available to manufacturers through agreements with Google.
The Commission identified four sets of contractual restrictions. First, under Mobile Application Distribution Agreements, Google required manufacturers to pre-install Google Search in order to obtain a licence for the Play Store. Second, Google required the pre-installation of Chrome together with Google Search and the Play Store. Third, under Anti-Fragmentation Agreements, manufacturers wishing to pre-install Google apps were prevented from selling devices running Android versions not approved by Google. Fourth, under certain Revenue Share Agreements, Google granted payments to manufacturers and mobile network operators on condition that they did not pre-install competing general search services on an agreed portfolio of devices.
The Commission considered these practices to be separate abuses and, at the same time, part of a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 TFEU, because they pursued the common objective of protecting and strengthening Google's dominant position in general search services and its related advertising revenues. The original fine imposed by the Commission amounted to EUR 4.342 billion.
Google and Alphabet challenged the decision before the General Court. By judgment of 14 September 2022, the General Court largely upheld the Commission's decision, annulling it in part in relation to the portfolio-based Revenue Share Agreements and reducing the fine to EUR 4.125 billion. Alphabet was held jointly and severally liable for part of the fine, amounting to approximately EUR 1.52 billion. Google and Alphabet then appealed to the Court of Justice, seeking the annulment of the General Court judgment, annulment of the Commission decision or, in the alternative, a further reduction of the fine.
The issues at stake
The case required the Court to address several questions of wider importance for digital competition enforcement. The first was whether the Commission had to demonstrate, through a counterfactual analysis, that the challenged tying practices, in particular the pre-installation of Google Search and Chrome as a condition for access to the Play Store, were the specific cause of the exclusionary effects identified.
The second was whether the Commission had to show that the practices were capable of excluding competitors that were as efficient as Google. This point was particularly sensitive because recent case-law on abuse of dominance has attached increasing importance to effects-based analysis, while also leaving open the question whether an as-efficient competitor test is always necessary. The third issue concerned the legal treatment of Android fragmentation. Google argued that the anti-fragmentation obligations were necessary to preserve the integrity, compatibility and quality of the Android ecosystem. The Commission, by contrast, considered that those obligations hindered the development and commercialisation of Android forks, thereby limiting potential competition.
The fourth concerned the consequences of the partial annulment of the Commission decision by the General Court. Since the General Court had annulled the finding of abuse relating to portfolio-based Revenue Share Agreements, Google argued that the finding of a single and continuous infringement and the resulting fine should have been more substantially affected.
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