On 16 July 2026, in case C-209/23, FT and RRC Sports GmbH v FIFA, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) adopted a preliminary ruling relating to the legality and compatibility with European Union (EU) law of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (the “FIFA Rules”). The judgment is the latest in a series of major rulings delivered in recent years concerning the compatibility with EU law of rules adopted by FIFA and other international football governing bodies.
Background to the dispute
Adopted in 2022, the FIFA Rules establish a worldwide regulatory framework for agents involved in international transfers of players and coaches and govern, inter alia, agents’ remuneration, licensing requirements, approaches to potential clients and the collection and publication of information, including transactions and even sanctions. FT, a football agent, and RRC Sports GmbH, a German company engaged in football-agent activities, promptly brought proceedings before the Landgericht Mainz, seeking an injunction preventing FIFA from applying several FIFA Rules. On 30 March 2023, the Landgericht Mainz referred the matter to the Court, seeking guidance on the compatibility of several of the FIFA Rules with the EU rules on competition, i.e. Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU and the general data protection regulation ("GDPR").
The issues at stake
The stakes for FIFA were high, as previous rulings addressing (such as, inter alia, case C-333/21, , case C-650/22, and case C-600/23,) had cast shadow over FIFA’s self-regulatory initiatives and judgments of international sporting bodies for their doubtful compatibility with EU law. The case therefore raised the broader question of how far FIFA may extend its regulatory authority beyond the organisation of football itself into the economically significant adjacent market for football agents. Although FIFA relied on several objectives connected with the functioning of that market, including information asymmetries and other market failures, the case required the CJEU to distinguish purely economic objectives from legitimate public-interest aims, such as professional and ethical standards, protection of clients, prevention of conflicts of interest and integrity of the transfer system.
The findings of the Court
The CJEU did not consider the FIFA Rules collectively as having an anticompetitive object. As regards, for instance, the cap on agents’ service fees, the Court considered that it could not be classified as restrictive by object merely because it imposed a maximum remuneration, since competition could continue below that ceiling. More problematic for the Court are notably the FIFA Rules on approaching clients, which overprotect incumbent agents by allowing outside agents to approach potential clients only during the final two months of the duration of exclusive representation agreements in force. As incumbent agent may renegotiate or renew the agreement any time before that period, the competitive advantage of incumbent agents is inherently harmful to competition, so that such rule could be qualified as a restriction of competition by its object.
As the Court found that the majority of the FIFA Rules may restrict competition by effect rather than by object, it examined the applicability of the Meca-Medina (case C-519/04 P) and Wouters (case C-309/99) case-law, according to which restrictive effects of rules of sports associations may fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU if they pursue legitimate objectives in the public interest and restrictions are genuinely necessary and proportionate. The CJEU nevertheless distinguished between legitimate public-interest objectives and certain purely economic objectives invoked by FIFA, such as addressing information asymmetries or improving the functioning of the agents’ market, which could not as such satisfy that test. Such restrictions may nevertheless qualify for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU if its cumulative conditions are fulfilled, including the existence of genuine efficiency gains. Also in this case, the CJEU expressed scepticism that FIFA Rules such as those on approaching potential clients, affording competitive advantages to incumbents, could achieve a genuine efficiency gain.
As in previous cases, the Court acknowledged that FIFA holds a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU as, at the same time, it organises the football ecosystem, carries out economic activities connected therewith and exercises regulatory, supervisory and sanctioning powers. The risk exists, therefore, that the FIFA Rules create the conditions for exclusionary abuses, where FIFA’s regulatory powers are used to steer or limit competition in the football-agent market according to economic interests of FIFA; or clubs and leagues affiliated indirectly therewith. Furthermore, exploitative abuses would also be possible through rules on licensing, involving payment of fees, to access the international transfer market, notwithstanding agents do not themselves supply services to FIFA. The Court also acknowledged that the introduction of FIFA Rules on licence conditions, restrictions to representation and approach to potential clients may affect agents established in Member States to provide cross-border services, as their profession was previously unregulated (or less strictly regulated). Those restrictions may in principle be justified by objectives such as preventing conflicts of interest and protecting clients. By contrast, the Court considered that preserving the contractual stability of the relationship between agents and clients is essentially an economic objective and cannot, by itself, justify a restriction on Article 56 TFEU.
The Court was even more categorical on the application of the GDPR. Certain FIFA Rules concern the collection and disclosure of substantial information concerning agents, their clients, transactions, remuneration and sanctions. This could be aligned with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, which allows processing necessary for the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or a third party, unless overridden by the rights and interests of the data subject. However, the processing must still satisfy necessity and proportionality, which FIFA’s Rules, imposing an indiscriminate and systematic disclosure of details concerning all transactions involving agents, would not meet. Likewise, indiscriminate publication of all sanctions irrespective of their seriousness failed the required balancing exercise. While publication of sufficiently serious sanctions may be justified, the same could not be assumed for all sanctions without regard to their seriousness, the harm caused or the passage of time.
The way forward
Following the ruling, the matter returns to the Landgericht Mainz, which must apply the Court’s interpretation and determine whether the individual FIFA Rules are compatible with the relevant requirements of EU law. Importantly, the judgment does not question FIFA’s ability, in principle, to regulate football agents. Rather, it confirms that such regulatory autonomy must be exercised within the limits imposed by EU competition law, the freedom to provide services and data-protection rules. FIFA may pursue legitimate objectives such as professional and ethical standards, protection of clients, prevention of conflicts of interest and integrity of the transfer system, but restrictions imposed for those purposes must satisfy the applicable requirements of necessity and proportionality. Purely economic objectives, by contrast, cannot merely by virtue of being pursued through sporting regulation constitute a public-interest justification for restrictions otherwise caught by EU law. In that sense, the judgment provides another reminder that, with great self-regulatory power comes great responsibility: sporting autonomy remains recognised, but its exercise is subject to effective scrutiny under EU law.
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